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THE MINNESOTA UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
AND THE LINCOLN MILLS CASE
MAYNARD

E. PiRsiG*

For Minnesota lawyers and judges interested in the law governing arbitration, two significant events took place in 1957. One was
the adoption by the Minnesota legislature of the Uniform Arbitration Act.' The other was the decision of the United States Supreme
2
A brief discusCourt in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mitlsy.
sion of the impact of these two developments is the purpose of this
article.
I
Minnesota was the first state to adopt the Uniform Arbitration
Act. 3 It was sponsored by the Minnesota State Bar Association,
again demonstrating its leadership in progressive legislation. There
appeared to be substantially no opposition to its enactment although
there was some temporary doubt on the part of those interested in
labor arbitration, inspired, no doubt, by some articles which gave a
distorted version to the meaning and effect of the Uniform Act.
Once the provisions of the act were fully examined, any doubts that
may have existed disappeared.
The prior Minnesota law on the subject was in a very unsatisfactory state. The former general statute on arbitration 4 goes back
unchanged to the 1905 revision. 5 The act in the 1905 revision was
in turn based on the Arbitration Act appearing in the 1866 revision"
but with some simplification and liberalization. The 1866 version
7
was substantially the same as that appearing in the 1851 revision.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Minnesota Commissioner on Uniform State Laws. Chairman, Committee on Arbitration,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The views
expressed on the Uniform Arbitration Act are those of the author only.
1. Minn. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 633. The statute has been coded as Minn.
Stat. § § 572.08-.28. In the text and footnotes of this article, the act will
be referred to simply by sections of the Minn. Sess. Laws.
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. The Uniform Act, with some modifications, was enacted also in
Fla. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 57-402.
4. Minn. Stat. § § 572.01-.07 (1953).
5. Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, c. 81.
6. Minn. Gen. Stat. 1866, c. 89.
7. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 96.
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The act in the 1851 revision stemmed primarily from the New York
statutes'then in force but with free departures in a good many
respects.'
This statute was of very narrow compass. It applied only to
agreements to arbitrate which complied with the technical form prescribed and in practice was seldom resorted to. Agreements not
within the terms of the statute were governed by common law principles. In Park Construction Co. v. Indepenatent Sclwol Dist.1" a
notable departure from these principles was made, when it was held
that an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute could be specifically
enforced, but in other respects the common laxw principles prevailed.
-Both the former general arbitration statute and the common law
principles are superseded by the new Uniform Act to the extent that
the act applies. Basically, the act is a simplified and modernized
version of the arbitration statutes of New York, first enacted in
1920"1 and adopted with various modifications in a number of other
states. 2 Section one of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This
act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees or between their respective representatives unless
otherwise provided in the agreement.'1
This section is necessitated in most states by the common law
principles otherwise prevailing. These have been summarized in the
Restatement of Contracts as follows :"'
8. See New York Rev. Stat. 1852, pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 14. This act was
basically the arbitration statute as it appeared in the New York revision of
1829. See N. Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 14. A brief history of the
arbitration statutes of New York is given in Pirsig, Some Comments on
Arbitration Legislation and the Uniform Act, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 685 (1957).
9. For example, Minn. Stat. 572.02 (1953) probably had its origin in
Iowa Rev. Stat. 1843, c. 4, § 2.
10. 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475 (1941).
11. N.Y. Laws 1920, c. 275; id., c. 925, art. 83.
12. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § § 1501-11 (1956); Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. § § 1280-93 (Deering 1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. § § 8151-67 (1949);
La. Rev. Stat. § § 9:4201-17 (1950); Mass. Gen. Laws c. 251, § § 1-22
(1932); Mich. Comp. Laws § § 645.1-24 (1948); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ § 542:1-10 (1955); N. J. Rev. Stat. § § 2A:40-1 to 40-2 (1951); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § § 2711.01-15 (Baldwin 1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § §
33.210-.340 (1953) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § § 161-200 (Purden 1930) ; R. I.
Gen. Laws Ann. § § 10-3-1 to 10-3-20 (1956) ; Wash. Rev. Code § § 7.04.040.220 (1951) ; Wis. Stat. § § 298.01-.18 (1955).
13. The section as it appears in Minn. Sess. Law (1957), c. 633, omits
the words "employers and" between the words "between" and "employees"
in the last sentence. However, the statute as enacted is as reproduced in the
text and will so appear in the Minnesota General Statutes.
14. Restatement, Contracts § 8550 (1932).

UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT

[A] bargain to arbitrate either an existing or a possible future
dispute is not illegal, unless the agreed terms of arbitration are
unfair, but will not be specifically enforced, and only nominal
damages are recoverable for its breach. Nor is any bargain to
arbitrate a bar to an action on the claim to which the bargain
relates.
The comment to the section states:
A bargain to arbitrate, though it is not illegal, is practically
unenforceable unless arbitration is named a condition..., since
the bargain gives rise to neither a right to substantial damages
nor to a right to specific performance. The authority of the
arbitrator is revocable by either at any time before an award
is made, and though the revocation is a violation of the agreement, the injured party is without substantial redress. If, however, the bargain to arbitrate is carried out and award made, the
award is binding. ... 15

In this state, the doctrine of revocability was repudiated by the
Park Construction Co. case and agreements to arbitrate any dispute
were subject to enforcement. Hence, section one introduces no new
doctrine in this state. Its major change is in the fact that such agreements now are enforceable under the provisions of this act rather
than by principles developed by judicial decision.
Section one is very broad in its terms. It covers agreements to
arbitrate "any existing controversy" and "any controversy thereafter arising between the parties."1 The disputes covered by the
agreement to arbitrate need not arise out of the contract in which
the arbitration clause appears; that is, the dispute need not relate
to the construction or meaning or breach of a term of the same
contract. The section would include the new insurance policies being
issued in which the insured driver of a car is insured against the
negligence of the driver of another car, and which require disputes
as to liability to be submitted to arbitration. It applies to arbitrations
of disputes over title to real estate, boundary disputes, money claims,
and any other disputes where countervailing considerations of public
policy are not present. Such considerations would, however, limit
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes relating to
divorce, custody of minor children, criminal charges, etc. Without
any explicit provision, the public interest would require that these
be determined only by litigation in court.
15. For a recent case applying these principles to an arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement, see Machine Products Co. v. Prairie
Local Lodge No. 1538, 94 So. 2d 344 (Miss. 1957).
16. Section 20 provides that "This act applies only to agreements made
subsequent to the taking effect of this act." (The effective date is April 24,
1957.) A contract renewed would undoubtedly be covered by the act.
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The act does not impose any requirement, by implication or
otherwise, that the dispute to be arbitrated be one that is justiciable,
that is, that it be one subject to litigation as a case or controversy in
court. In fact, the implication is to the contrary, for section twelve
provides that "the fact that relief [granted by an arbitration award]
was such it could not or would not be granted by a court of law
or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the
award.".

7

The provision that agreements to arbitrate between employers
and employees or their representatives may stipulate that the act
shall not apply was incorporated to placate the fears these interests
might have about the possible unknown adverse consequences of
the act. If such a stipulation is inserted, the common law principles
heretofore developed by judicial decision will apply. In view of the
unsatisfactory state of the law which these principles represent, it is
anticipated that these agreements will rarely undertake to invoke
the exemption.
The act does not permit the same option to the parties of other
arbitration agreements. The intent is that this act shall be the exclusive law governing these agreements on all questions to which it is
applicable. Undoubtedly, a provision in a contract that the right to
arbitrate shall be revocable at the option of either or both of the
parties would be valid and permit the party to refuse to arbitrate at
his pleasure. This would be one of the "grounds as existed at law
or in'equity for the revocation of any contract."'" But, until so revoked, the provisions of the Uniform Act would govern.
The act does not apply to oral contracts to arbitrate. It was believed that the existence of an agreement should not be left to the
uncertainties of an oral agreement. The question may be raised
whether such agreements are governed by common law principles.
In most states, this would be of no great moment for if such an
agreement were claimed, it could promptly be revoked with little
consequence to the revoking party. Minnesota presents a somewhat
different situation. An oral agreement to arbitrate a dispute, whether
one then existing or to arise in the future, may have been enforceable under prior Minnesota law.' 9 If so, it might be argued that
17. An illustration is afforded by Zelle v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
242 Minn. 439, 65 N.W.2d 583 (1954), in which the parties had agreed that
if the parties could not agree to a revision of the terms of the contract,
contingent on certain events, the dispute should be submitted to arbitration.
The arbitration agreement was sustained. The revision of a contract would
hardly be the subject matter for litigation in court.
18. Section 1.
19. See Larson v. Nygaard, 148 Minn. 104, 180 N.W. 1002 (1921). In
this case there was an oral submission but the only question before the court
was the validity of the written award made pursuant thereto.
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this continues to be the law since the Uniform Act does not explicitly
provide otherwise. However, it is believed that the better construction of the act is that in providing that a "written" agreement to
arbitrate is "valid, enforceable and irrevocable,"20 the intent was
to deny the same characteristics to an oral agreement. Of course,
if, under an oral agreement, a dispute has in fact been submitted
to an arbitrator and he has rendered an award in writing, the award
should be sustained even though the original agreement was oral.
Section one provides that the arbitration agreement can be revoked on grounds that are applicable to contracts generally. Such
grounds would include fraud, mistake, and rescission by mutual
agreement. The defenses of waiver and estoppel would also be
available. 21 However, the claim that the party seeking arbitration
has breached the contract, when that question is the one on which
arbitration is sought, could not be asserted as a ground for avoiding
the arbitration. 22 Likewise, a party cannot ignore the arbitration
clause and bring suit for the breach covered by it on the ground
that the breach permits him to disregard the clause. The existence of
the breach is the very question which the parties had agreed to
22
submit to arbitration.
20. Section 1.

21. In Knutson v. Lasher, 219 Minn. 594, 18 N. W. 2d 688 (1945), at
the commencement of the arbitration hearing, the defendant served notice of
revocation and withdrew. The plaintiff also abandoned the proceeding and
commenced suit on the contract. The defendant asserted a set-off based on
a claim covered by the arbitration clause. It was held that both parties had
waived the arbitration clause and that defendant was therefore entitled to
assert the set-off. Accord. Independent School Dist. No. 35 v. A. Hedenberg
& Co., 214 Minn. 82, 89, 7 N. W. 2d 511, 516 (1943). The court stated:
The agreement to arbitrate was not irrevocable in the sense that
it could not be modified by mutual agreement or waived by mutual
acquiescence of the parties in submitting their controversy to a court
of law. The word 'irrevocable,' even as used in an arbitration statute,
means that the contract to arbitrate cannot be revoked at the will of one
party over the objection of the other, but that it can only be set aside
for facts existing at or before the time of its making, which would
permit revocation of any other contract.

22: Arbitration Between Potoker and Brooklyn Eagle, 2 N. Y. 2d
553, 141 N. E. 2d 841 (1957).
23. Fire insurance policies containing appraisal of loss clauses present
a special problem which has led to some confusion in Minnesota cases. While
these appraisals are considered by the Minnesota court as a form of arbitration, see discussion infra, p: 341, they spring from special statutory provisions
of the insurance law, are limited to the narrow question of the amount of
the loss and do not touch on other questions of liability. The court first took
the position that "an unequivocal denial of all liability [leaves] no basis for
an arbitration; hence it was a waiver of any right to an arbitration." Cash
v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 111 Minn. 162, 165, 126 N. W. 524, 525 (1910).
Without warrant, this was extended to a contract of employment in Anderson
v. M. Burg & Sons, Inc., 170 M inn. 53, 57, 212 N. W. 9, 11 (1927). However,
in Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Minn. 215, 212 N. W. 449 (1927),
and Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 220 N. W.
425 (1928), this position was repudiated and the insurer permitted to deny
liability without waiver of the right to an appraisal.
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The Uniform Act applies only to arbitrations. Sometimes the
question raised is whether the agreement is one for arbitration or
for some other method of resolving the dispute. A party may agree
to abide by the decision of a third person that may be arrived at by
a procedure which does not constitute an arbitration. For example,
an employer may agree to pay his employee's wages during the
latter's illness, the existence and extent of the illness to be determined by a physician agreed upon. Plainly, the parties do not intend
the physician to conduct an arbitration proceeding. 24 A lease may
provide that the lessee may purchase the leased property at a price
and on terms to be determined by a designated third person. Arbitration is not intended thereby. 25 A sale of stock may be at a price having a prescribed ratio to corporate earnings, the earnings to be
determined by an accountant. The accountant is not an arbitrator. 8
The scaling of logs by the state, to be conducted by a designated
27
public official, does not contemplate arbitration.
In each of these instances, the parties could have agreed to resolve the issues by arbitration. Whether they did so in a given
agreement has been the subject of considerable confusion in the
decisions. No clear test for determining the distinction has been developed. Sometimes it is said that "valuations, calculations, or
measurements" are merely "ministerial acts. '28 But, in the illustrations given above, the fixing of a price or the determination of
earnings surely is more than ministerial and calls for the exercise
of very considerable judgment and probably investigation of fact.
In other cases, arbitrations are considered to be concerned with the
settlement of disputes, while valuations, etc., are deemed to call
merely for the decision of the third party without reference to a
24. See Shepard & Morse Lumber Co. v. Collins, 198 Ore. 290, 256

P. 2d 500 (1953).
25. See Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P. 2d 757, 157 A. L. R.
1277 (1945).
26. See Sanitary Farm Dairies v. Gammel, 195 F. 2d 106 (8th Cir. 1952).
27. See State v. Equitable Surety Co., 140 Minn. 48, 50-51, 167 N. W.
292, 293 (1918), stating:

Without authority of any statute, parties may, if they see fit, stipulate in a contract of sale that the quantity of the property sold shall be
determined by the estimate of a designated person or official. No public
policy forbids this.... Contracts of this kind are common in business

transactions. A familiar instance is the ordinary form of building contract,
by the terms of which the estimate of the supervising architect is made
final. Such provisions are universally sustained .... A requirement of
notice will not be implied. In this respect, such a case differs from an
arbitration where the aid or presence of the parties may be of importance.
See also Hayday v. Mammermill Paper Co., 176 Minn. 315, 223 N. W.

614 (1929).
28. Nelson v. Charles Betcher Lumber Co., 88 Minn. 517, 521, 93
N. W. 661, 662 (1903).
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dispute and, indeed, for the purpose of preventing a dispute.2 9 But,

rather than offering a determinative guide, this appears to be no
more than a descriptive statement of the kind of situations in which
one or the other of these procedures is in fact used. Again, "the
final test should be whether or not the parties intended the 'arbitrators' to determine ultimate liability or merely facts incidental
thereto."30 This test, also, seems to be an unworkable one. Most
likely it was suggested by the distinction drawn at common law
between an arbitration agreement limited to a narrow issue and
leaving the dispute to be resolved in court (which was upheld)
and a general submission to arbitration (which was not). Certainly,
parties may agree that the narrow issue may be submitted to arbitration and, on the other hand, the single issue submitted.to a third
person for decision without arbitration contemplated may be the
sole one and thus determine liability. Finally, and more suggestive
of the basic question, it has been stated that if the agreement contemplates that the third person is to act on his own judgment and
not on the basis of data submitted to him, an arbitration is not
intended.31
Without undertaking to suggest a precise test, it may be stated
that the Uniform Arbitration Act was not intended to apply to
a case in which the agreement provides for an automatic referral
of a limited question of fact to a third person, who is to exercise
his judgment or apply his knowledge without reference to a hearing
or submission of data by the parties. Whether the agreement does so
provide must le determined on the basis of the facts of the particular
case and the terms of the particular agreement. Common business
practice, in the light of which the agreement was made, will have an
important bearing on how the agreement should be construed.
The question will probably most frequently arise with respect to
agreements providing for what are called appraisals or valuations,
particularly those appearing in fire insurance policies. The leading
case is It re Fletcher,32 in which some corporate stock had been
sold at a "fair value" to be "determined by an appraisal thereof made
by three arbiters, one to be appointed by [the buyer] another to be
appointed by [the seller] and a third to be appointed by the other
29. See Citizens Bldg. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 F. 2d 982 (5th
Cir. 1941) ; In re Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. 248 (1924).
30. 6 Williston, Contracts § 1921A (rev. ed. 1938). See also Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Minn. 215, 212 N. W. 449 (1927) ; Shepard
& Morse Lumber Co. v. Collins, 198 Ore. 290, 256 P. 2d 500 (1953).
31. Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P. 2d 757 (1945).
32. 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924).
33. Id. at 442-43, 143 N.E. at 249.
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two. 13 3 This was held not to come within the terms of the New York
Arbitration Act. The court observed:
Even prior to the Arbitration Law the courts have held that a
provision in a contract that before a right of action arises certain
facts shall be determined or amounts and values ascertained is
valid and not against public policy..., and it cannot be doubted
that the provision of the contract under consideration comes
within this rule. The primary purpose of the Arbitration Law
was to make valid and enforcible provisions for arbitration which
had previously been regarded as contrary to public policy but it
also provides a practical method for the enforcement of such provisions and both the letter and spirit of the statute require the
courts to hold that this method was intended to apply to all contracts "to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising ;"
both those which were regarded as valid before the Arbitration
Law as well as those which were regarded as contrary to public
policy. On the other hand, the language of the statute should
not be stretched to cover contracts which do not come within
its plain intent where the application of the method of procedure
provided in the statute is not practicable.
The provisions [of the statutes on arbitration] require hearing
upon notice and the taking of an oath by the arbitrators. They
confer upon the arbitrators all the powers which are "conferred
upon a board or member of a board authorized by law to hear
testimony" including the power to require the attendance of
witnesses. They give the arbitrators the right in their awards
to require the payment by either party of fees and expenses.
They fix the form of an award. They provide for motions to
confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award and they permit
the entry of a judgment after the confirmation of an award. That
judgment "may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an
action in the court in which it is entered" and "an appeal may
be taken from an order vacating an award, or from a judgment
entered upon an award, as from an order or judgment in an
action." These provisions are appropriate to proceedings where
parties substitute judges of their own choice for judges chosen
by the state in the determination of disputes otherwise cognizable
by the courts alone; they can have no application to proceedings
through which disinterested persons are authorized to settle
questions which would otherwise be left to the determination of
the parties to the contract.34
In 1941 the New York Arbitration Act was amended to provide
that it should apply to "questions arising out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral, incidental,
34. Id. at 445, 447, 143 N.E. at 249-50. Following this view, it was
held in In re American Ins. Co., 208 App. Div. 168, 203 N.Y.S. 206 (1924),
that the New York Arbitration Act did not apply to the provisions of a fire
insurance policy calling for an appraisal of the loss in the event of disagreement.
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precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties." 35 After
some intimation by the New York Court of Appeals that the act still
did not cover appraisal provisions in fire insurance policies,36 the
act was further amended to make it applicable even though the
appraisal was "independent" of any issue between the parties.37
Nevertheless, in In re DelmarBox Co.38 it was held that the act was
still inapplicable. The court followed the theory of In re Fletcher,
that the arbitration procedure provided by the act was not suited to
the appraisal process contemplated by the fire insurance policy. It
maintained that the appraisal procedure as developed by New York
decisions contemplated an investigation by the appraisers themselves without the necessity of a formal hearing or formal notice
to the parties. "[T] hey may apparently proceed by ex parte investigation, so long as the parties are given an opportunity to make
statements and explanations to the appraisers with regard to the
matters in issue." 30 The court also noted that the umpire in an
appraisal performed a different function than in an arbitration and
that the setting aside of an appraisal for reasons not attributable
to the insured permitted suit on the policy while, if an arbitrator's
award is set aside, this results in a new arbitration hearing. Because of these basic differences, the court felt the Arbitration Act
should not apply.
This history was before the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws when the Uniform Arbitration Act
was promulgated. The omission of appraisals, valuations, etc., was
deliberate. It was not intended that they should be covered by the
act.
The Minnesota standard fire policy must contain the following
provision:
In case the insured and this company, except in 'case of total
loss on buildings, shall fail to agree as to the actual cash value
or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each
shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify
the other of the appraiser selected within 20 days of such demand. In case either fails to select an appraiser within the time
provided, then a presiding judge of the district court of the
county wherein the loss occurs may appoint such appraiser for
such party upon application of the other party in writing by
giving five days' notice thereof in writing to the party- failing
35. N.Y. Laws 1941, c. 288.
36. See Syracuse Say. Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 403, 94
N.E. 2d 73 (1950).
37. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 757.

38. 309 N.Y. 60, 127 N.E. 2d 808 (1955).
39. Id. at 64, 127 N.E. 2d at 811.
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to appoint. The appraisers shall first select a competent and
disinterested umpire; and failing for 15 days to agree upon such
umpire, then a presiding judge of the above mentioned court
may appoint such an umpire upon application of party in writing
by giving five days' notice thereof in writing to the other party.
The appraisers shall then appraise the loss, stating separately
actual value and loss to each item; and failing to agree, shall
submit their differences, only, to the umpire. An award in writing, so itemized, of any two when filed with this company shall
determine the amount of actual value and loss. Each appraiser
shall be paid by the party selecting him, or for whom he was
selected, and the expense of the appraisal and umpire shall be
paid by the parties equally."°
The substance of these provisions has been in force in this state
for many years, and the language corresponds to similar legislation
in New York and other states. However, the interpretation given
these provisions by the Minnesota court is quite different from that
which has been followed in In re Fletcherand In re Delmar Box Co.
While the New York court has emphasized the fact that appraisers
may act on their own without a hearing and are, therefore, not
arbitrators, the Minnesota court has taken the position that they
cannot act on their own investigation or knowledge but, like
arbitrators, must conduct a hearing at which the parties are entitled
to be heard. Thus it has said:
The board of referees provided for under the standard policy is a
quasi court, subject to the principles governing common-law
arbitration. Such board should sit in a body, and receive evidence
offered by the respective parties, submitting the same to the usual
tests of cross-examination. While its individual members are
prohibited from privately collecting evidence from different
sources, a reasonable latitude is allowed them in the examination
of the premises, remnants of goods, and causes of the fire, for
the purpose of better understanding and weighing the evidence
on the principal question before them, viz., what is the just damage to the property involved? But, while a certain liberalty is permissible in acquainting themselves with the circumstances surrounding the fire without the medium of witnesses, such board
is not selected for the purpose of seeking evidence secretly, and
determining the amount of the loss by reason of such personal
knowledge. 1
40. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65.011 (Supp. 1956). The statute is quoted as
amended by Minn. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 482.
41. Christianson v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 84 Minn. 526, 530,
88 N.W. 16, 18 (1901) ; accord, Dufresne v. Marine Ins. Co., 157 Minn. 390,
196 N.W. 560 (1923); McQuaid Market House Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 147
Minn. 254, 180 N.W. 97 (1920). An appraiser evaluating property under
a lease was held an arbitrator within the meaning of a criminal statute
forbidding promises to decide for or against a party in Earle v. Johnson,
81 Minn. 472, 84 N.W. 332 (1900). "The proceeding is, in effect, a commonlaw arbitration."
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From this it might be concluded that the Uniform Arbitration Act
should be held to apply. There is much to be said in favor of this
view. There is nothing in the nature of a dispute over the amount
of a fire loss which should exempt it when the attributes of arbitration have heretofore been applied to the appraisal. The repeated
attempts to extend the New York Arbitration Act to appraisals
indicates a very substantial opinion that the benefits of the act
should be so extended.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the better view is that the act
does not apply. Even under the Minnesota theory of the nature of
appraisals, there may be some peculiarities and special problems
that call for different treatment. These should be considered on their
own merits. The appraisal clause is part of the statutory law of
insurance. It was not intended that it should be superseded by the
enactment of the Uniform Act. If a change is to be made in the
law governing appraisals under insurance policies, it would be preferable to amend the statutes on the subject and explicitly provide
that appraisals are to be made in accordance with the provisions of
the Uniform Act.
Preliminary to an arbitration hearing, there must be some formulation of the question which the arbitrator is being asked to determine. The act does not deal with this subject, and hence the
traditional informality of proceeding will suffice. If the agreement
is to arbitrate an existing dispute, the parties in the process of executing the agreement will arrive at a formulation of the issues in
dispute. If the agreement was made prior to the dispute now existing, the party seeking arbitration will ordinarily have to frame the
issues he wants arbitrated. In practical operation,-this will consist
of some written form of a demand for arbitration served upon the
opposing party. It may be merely a letter or some more formal notice. Formal rules of pleading need not be observed. 42 The proper
framing of the question is still, however, of considerable importance
both as a guide to the arbitrator and to the court in the event a mo42. Zelle v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 242 Minn. 439, 448, 65 N.W2d

583, 589-90 (1954) stating:

The demands arising from a controversy between the parties which
are to be submitted to arbitration must be sufficiently described so as to be
identifiable either from the contractual provision or with the aid of parol
evidence if that be necessary. It is not necessary that they should be in the
same specific form as required in a pleading. The only requirement is that
the demands be described sufficiently to be identified....
The provision constituting the submission agreement may be in
general terms without specification or enumeration as to the various
items in dispute. Reference to arbitrators of 'all matters in dispute' with
reference to the subject matter has been held sufficiently certain and
comprehensive to support an award. Cyacchiolo v. Carlucci, 62 Ariz. 284
157 P.2d 352.
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tion to compel arbitration must be made. The demand should, of
course, be limited to the questions to which the arbitration clause
is limited.
A clear statement of the issues sought to be arbitrated may avoid
much trouble and litigation later. Thus, in McKay vu.McKay, 41 in
submitting their differences to arbitration, the partners failed to
make clear whether the arbitrator was to have power to direct dissolution of the partnership. In sustaining the trial court's decision
that the arbitrator did not have such power, the Minnesota Supreme
Court observed:
The trouble with the arbitration agreement and the proceeding is that it nowhere appears with any certainty what questions,
if any, were to be or were submitted to arbitration outside of
the matter of the account between the parties relating to the
partnership.
The general rule is that the subject matter of a controversy
should be so specifically set out as to leave no reasonable doubt
as to what has been submitted ....

[T]he parties do not agree

as to what was submitted to arbitration outside of the matter of
the account.44
Included in the demand for arbitration should be a request that
the opposing party take the steps specified in the contract for the
appointment of the arbitrators.4 5
There is, of course, nothing to prevent the opposing party from
specifying other issues which he wishes included in the arbitration
proceeding.
Should the party seeking arbitration desire not to proceed with
an arbitration hearing without settlement of his right thereto, he
now has a new and simple remedy open to him under section 2 (a),
which provides:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in
Section 1, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court
shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the
opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of
the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the
moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied.
43. 187 Minn. 521, 246 N.W. 12 (1932).
44. Id. at 525-26, 246 N.W. at 14.
45. Refusal so to act would warrant an application under §3, reading:
If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of
arbitrators, this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if
the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when
an arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act and his successor has
not been duly appointed, the court on application of a party shall
appoint one or more arbitrators. An arbitrator so appointed has all the
powers of one specifically named in the agreement.
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This works a major change in Minnesota law with respect to the
procedure available for the enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
Heretofore, except for the limited area covered by section 572 of the
Minnesota statute, the enforcement of these agreements appeared to
be confined to the bringing of an ordinary action, either for specific
performance or for a declaratory judgment that the arbitration
agreement was enforceable accompanied with an order for arbitration."
4
In Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 7
an action had been commenced on an award in an arbitration proceeding conducted over the objection of the defendant. It was held
that the defendant could not revoke his agreement to arbitrate and,
thus, the award was valid and enforceable. By analogy, if an action
were brought on issues the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the defendant probably could assert the agreement as a defense to the
action.
This probably exhausted the means available for enforcing an
arbitration clause and all these were dilatory, cumbersome and expensive. Section 2 (a) substitutes a motion procedure', governed by
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The following motion
should suffice.
A.B., Petitioner,
v.
Motion for Order to Compel Arbitration
C.D., Respondent:
To the Above Named Respondent:
Please take notice that upon the affidavits of E.F. and G.H.,
attached hereto, petitioner will move the above named court at
a special term thereof to be held at the city of
Minnesota, in the above named County, on
19-,
at
o'clock, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be
heard, for an order:
(1) Directing the above named parties to proceed with arbitration pursuant to agreement entered into by them on
19 -

, of the following issues:

[Here state the issues as demanded prior to the motion.]
(2) Appointing an arbitrator, in the event that the parties
cannot agree thereon or the defendant refuses to participate
therein.
46. The declaratory judgment procedure was followed in Zelle v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 242 Minn. 439, 65 N.W. 2d 583 (1954). The
granting of summary judgment to the plaintiff was sustained.
47. 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475, 135 A.L.R. 59 (1941).

48. Section 16 provides:

Except as otherwise provided, an application to the court under
this act shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon
the notice provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing
of motions. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, notice of an initial
application for an order shall be served in the manner provided by law
for the service of a summons in an action.
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This notice of motion should be served as is a summons in an
action. It should be accompanied with affidavits setting out the contract upon which it is claimed the right to arbitration rests and the
existence of the disputes upon which arbitration is sought. If there
are certain conditions, compliance with which is required by the
contract before the right to arbitration arises, such as observance
of the grievance procedure provided in a collective bargaining agreement, the affidavits should show that these conditions have been
complied with. It should also appear that a demand for arbitration
of these disputes has been made. The respondent has, of course, the
right to interpose counter-affidavits denying any or all of these facts.
The issues thus presented are tried by the court without a jury. If
necessary to a full or adequate presentation of the facts, oral testi49
mony may be taken as on any other motion.
Ordinarily, the only question likely to be raised is whether the
respondent is under a duty to submit the particular dispute involved
to arbitration. This will turn on the proper construction to be made
of the arbitration clause. If he has not agreed to arbitrate the issue
in dispute, he should not be compelled to do so. Under the Uniform
Act, unless he has agreed to submit this question also to arbitration,
he is entitled to a judicial determination of it.
This seems simple enough, and yet this question of arbitrability
has caused a considerable amount of litigation. Some of the decisions have been properly open to the criticism that the courts have
invaded the function of the arbitrator under the guise of passing on
the question of arbitrability of the dispute. This problem was considered at length by those entrusted with the preparation of the
Uniform Act for the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws and the conclusion reached was that the act should
limit the court's function on a motion to compel arbitration to determining "the existence of the agreement to arbitrate." 50
An order for an arbitration should be denied if the terms of the
arbitration clause are clear, and (putting the pending dispute beside
them) if it is evident that any possible award that the arbitrator
could make would not come within them. More difficult situations
arise when interpretation of the arbitration clause also decides the
dispute which the parties intended to leave to arbitration. Thus, a
collective bargaining agreement prohibits transfers from one job to
another without consultation with the union and provides that any
disputes as to such transfers shall be arbitrated. The employer without consultation transfers an employee from one machine to another
49. Ibid.
50. Section 2 (a).
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less desirable, but performing the same function. The employer cbntends that since it is the same job, there was therefore no transfer
and hence nothing to arbitrate. The dispute is one of the kind contemplated which should be settled by arbitration. Hence the court
should not determine what was intended by the term "transfer"
under the guise of determining the authority of the arbitrator. To
do so would decide the issue in dispute and leave nothing to arbitrate.
A more common provision is one in a collective bargaining
agreement that the construction, interpretation and application of
the various provisions of the contract shall be determined by arbitration in case of a dispute that cannot be resolved by the usual grievance procedures. Sometimes a provision is added that the arbitrator
shall not add to or vary the terms of the contract. The management
wishes to discontinue a portion of its operations or to move the
plant to another location. The union insists it was an implied term
of the agreement that operations were to continue without such
drastic changes, and demands arbitration. It is an easy error for a
court to conclude on a motion to compel arbitration that what is not
in the contract is not subject to arbitration, and that the contract
did not deal with these prerogatives of management. But, whatever
the merits of that position, they are not for the court to determine.
The issue involves the interpretation of the contract and this has
been left to the arbitrator. To hold otherwise would destroy the arbitration clause itself. To avoid these judicial invasions of the arbitrator's authority, the Uniform Act deliberately confined the courts'
function to the determination of "the existence of the agreement to
arbitrate."'li There is, of course, nothing to prevent the parties from
agreeing to a more restricted arbitration clause. Further, whether
the arbitrator has gone beyond his authority remains a question
that is to be determined after he has made his award.
Under the New York Arbitration Act, it has been held that, before a court would direct arbitration, it must appear that the dispute
sought to be arbitrated was bona fide and that there was some
reasonable basis or ground for making the claim. 52 What might seem
51. Ibid. A somewhat more detailed discussion of the question of
arbitrability under the Uniform Act appears in Pirsig, Some Comments on
Arbitration Legislation and the Uniform Act, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 692

(1957).
52. See Alpert v. Admiration Knitwear Co., 304 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E. 2d
561 (1952); General Electric Co. v. United Elec. Radio and Machine
Workers, CIO, 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E. 2d 181 (1949) ; International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317

(1947), aff'd per curiam, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). But See
Bohlinger v. National Cash Register Co., 305 N.Y. 539, 114 N.E.2d 31 (1953).
These cases are discussed in some detail in Pirsig, Some Comments on

Arbitration Legislation and the Uniform Act, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 695
(1957).
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groundless or bad faith to a judge might appear quite differently
to the arbitrator. To avoid substitution of the judge's view for that
of the arbitrator, the Uniform Act provides that "an order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the claim in issue
lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds for the
claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown."53
There are other procedures than the motion to confirm under the
act by which the foregoing questions may be raised. The party resisting arbitration may himself bring the matter into court by a motion to stay an arbitration commenced or threatened, and raise the
question that there was no arbitration agreement. 54 This is, in substance, a summary means of obtaining a declaratory judgment on
the issue. Or the party may appear at the arbitration hearing, make
his objection and thereafter, if he likes, participate in the hearing
without losing his objection. He may then oppose on this ground a
motion to confirm any award rendered against him, or he may make
his own motion to vacate the award. 55 He may also disregard the
hearing and raise the objection by attacking the award rendered
against him. But in that event, if the objection does not prevail, he
will have lost his opportunity to appear at the hearing. The act also
provides that if an action is brought on an issue subject to arbitration, the defendant may move for a stay and an order directing
arbitration.-6
By these several methods, the duty of a party to submit an issue
to arbitration may be determined prior to the arbitration hearing
itself and in all of them the principles governing the judicial function
stated above will control.
Section five is the principal section governing arbitration hearings. It provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
(a) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the
hearing and cause notification to the parties to be served personally or by registered mail not less than five days before the
hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives such notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as necessary and, on a request of a party and for good cause, or upon
their own motion may postpone the hearing to a time not later
than the date fixed by the agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later date. The arbitrators may hear
and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to appear. The
53.
54.
55.
56.

Section 2(e).
Section 2(b).
Section 12(1) (5).
Section 2(c) and (d).
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court on application may direct the arbitrators to proceed
promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy.
(b) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence
and to cross-examine witnesses
material to the controversy
57
appearing at the hearing.
These provisions clarify the procedure to be followed where the
arbitration agreement does not define it. They are designed to assure
notice and a fair hearing 56 and to provide some flexibility to the
conduct of the hearing, including the rendering of a default award
where the opposing party fails to appear. 9 The procedure prescribed
may be changed by agreement and its observance may be waived. 0
Subdivision (b) states no more than the traditional rights given a
party in an arbitration hearing."- Failure to observe the essentials
of this section with resulting prejudice to a party entitles him to a
vacation of an adverse award. 2 Other sections give the right to be
represented by an attorney which cannot be waived prior to the
hearing0 3 and empower the arbitrator to issue subpoenas and permit
the taking of depositions. Depositions may be used only where the
witness cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hearing and
the arbitrator concludes that the information he has is essential to
the hearing. The general use of depositions would defeat the purpose
of keeping the proceeding an informal one capable of being conducted by laymen not Versed in the refinements of procedure.
57. Subdivision (c) provides for hearing by all of the arbitrators but
determination by a majority is sufficient. If any one of them ceases to act,
the remaining neutral arbitrators may continue.
58. "Neither party was entitled to be present when the arbitrators were
deliberating on their award, after the parties had submitted their respective
claims. A fair opportunity to present a claim to arbitrators, which a party
is entitled to, and to be present to meet the claim of his adversary, does not
include the right to be present when the arbitrators are making up their
award." Segal v. Fred, 105 Minn. 126, 128, 117 N.W. 225, 226 (1908).
59. Proceedings by default were permitted under the common law rule
in this state prior to the act. Knutson v. Lasher, 219 Minn. 594, 600, 18
N.WV.2d 688, 693 (1945). N. Y. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 325, introduces a most
novel procedure, by which an award may be obtained "by confession." Both
parties must sign a sworn statement stating the award to be made and facts
showing a just liability has been confessed. Thereupon, the arbitrator or the
agency designated to name the arbitrator or by whose rules the arbitration
was to be governed may make the award agreed upon. The apparent purpose
is to avoid a hearing and the expense of an arbitrator, both parties having
agreed to the award which may be rendered. Why the cumbersome procedure provided was necessary for this purpose is not evident.
60. Waiver was found in Lamper Bros. Lumber Co. v. Jake Lampert
Yards, Inc., 176 Minn. 622, 224 N.W. 248 (1929). See Dufresne v. Marine
Ins. Co., 157 Minn. 390, 196 N. W. 560 (1923).
61. "[C]ertainly under common law rules relating to arbitration the
parties are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.... " Dufresne
v. Marine Ins. Co., 157 Minn. 390, 392, 196 N.W. 560, 561 (1923).
62. Section 12(4) set out in the text at p. 352.
63. Section 6.
64. Rule 27.07, Minn. Rules of Civ. Proc., which provided for depositions in arbitration cases is superseded by § 6. See § 24(2) so providing.
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There is no attempt to prescribe the manner in which the hearing
shall be conducted. That the traditional informality of such hearings
will be continued is assumed. Unless the agreement provides otherwise, no stenographic record of the testimony need be made; witnesses may but need not be sworn; technical objections to the
reception of evidence have no place; and affidavits, signed statements, and hearsay may be received, the parties being free, of course,
to urge upon the arbitrator the value that such evidence does or does
not have. There is no requirement that there be findings of fact by
the arbitrators and none need be made. 65 Neither is there any prohibition against such findings and the arbitrator will usually be well
advised to state the reasons for his decision and award.
The act requires the award rendered to be in writing and signed
by the arbitrators joining in it and it must be made within the governing time limits. Copies must be sent to the parties. 6
If, on receiving the award, a party deems it incomplete or unclear or indefinite, the act permits a party to apply to the arbitrator
for a clarification of the award. 7 This is a quite unique feature of
the act which should prove helpful in many cases and avoid litigation over the meaning of an award or over its validity. Absent such
a provision, the powers of the arbitrator have been considered terminated and they have no power even to correct an obvious mistake."'
But there are definite limits to what an arbitrator may do under this
authority. He may "modify or correct the award upon the grounds
stated in clauses (1) and (3) of subdivision 1, section 13,609 or for
65. See McQuaid Market House Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 254,
257, 180 N.W. 97, 98 (1920) stating, "It is well settled, in the absence of
statute otherwise providing, that in the common-law arbitration the arbitrators need not specify in detail the facts made the basis of their decision, but
may report the result of their deliberations in the form of general conclusions,
which determine the points involved, together with a statement of the gross
allowance made."
66. Section 8.

67. Section 9.
68.
69.

Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § 220 (1930).
Subdivision 1 of §13 provides the grounds for modification by the

court on motion and reads as follows:

(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to

in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of
the decision upon the issue submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
Subsection (2) was excluded from the grounds for modification by
the arbitrator since it would permit him to pass on his own powers.
This is a question reserved for the court unless the agreement otherwise
provides. See §12, subdiv. 1(3), set out on p. 352.
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the purpose of clarifying the award."7 He may not under the guise
of clarification, make a new and inconsistent award nor is he permitted by this section alone to undertake a rehearing of the case. 71
Once the award has been rendered, it may be reduced to judgment by simply moving for an order to confirm the award. 72 On
such a motion the opposing party must assert all the defenses he
may have to the enforcement of the award. Indeed, he must assert
his defenses within the 90 day period specified for the assertion of
grounds for avoiding an award, whether or not a motion to confirm
has been made. If no motion to confirm is made within that period,
he must bring his own motion to vacate the award or his defenses
are lost.

73

The motions to confirm an award and for the reduction of the
award to judgment 74 and the motions to vacate or modify or correct
an award are the exclusive means of accomplishing these ends. An
action on the award or an action to vacate or set aside an award or
for an injunction against the enforcement of an award7 5 or for a
declaratory judgment on any of these questions is no longer permissible. To permit them would expose the arbitration process to
the delays and expense of litigation which it was the purpose of the
act to avoid.
The grounds for vacating an award are the following:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed
as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party;
70. Section 9.
71.

The court may order a rehearing under §12 before the same or

new arbitrators in the event the award is vacated.
72. Section 11.
73. Section 11 provides:

Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless
within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for

vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the
court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13.
Subdivision 2 of §12 provides:
An application under this section shall be made within ninety days after

delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated
upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within
ninety days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
74. See §14, providing in part, "Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment or decree shall be
entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or
decree."
75. A temporary restraining order or injunction pending the hearing
of a motion to vacate or modify would appear to be permissible to inaintain
the status quo pending the hearing of the motion.
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(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was
not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the
party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without rais76

ing the objection.

These grounds have been widely enacted in numerous states and
had their origin in the New York Revision of 1829, which in turn
attempted only the codification of the existing common law principles. They appeared in substantial part in the former Minnesota
general arbitration act 77 but the act was used so seldom that there

has been practically no opportunity for judicial interpretation of
these provisions, and such Minnesota law as there was on these
questions was developed as the common law of the state independent
of the statute. So far as section twelve embodies common law principles, the prior Minnesota decisions will be relevant.
Few direct charges of corruption, fraud or undue influence appear in the Minnesota cases. The court had displayed considerable
interference with awards made by appraisers of losses covered by
fire insurance policies but these present peculiar problems and the
principles developed should not be applied to arbitrations generally.78
76. Section 12.
77. Minn. Stat. §572.05 (1953), which included also as a ground that
"the award is contrary to law and evidence."
78. A dictum frequently appearing in the cases is that an award may
be so gross or inadequate or excessive as to evidence fraud warranting
setting it aside. This was applied to sustain a verdict for $950, the award
for $470 being set aside by the jury in the process, in Baldinger v. Camden
Fire Ins. Assn., 121 Minn. 160, 141 N.W. 104 (1913). Why a jury should
be permitted to set aside an award is not apparent or discussed.
In Kaufman Jewelry Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 172 Minn.
314, 215 N.W. 65 (1927), a fire loss appraisal was set aside because the
appraiser excluded from their consideration the fact that some of the
property may have been stolen after the fire rather than consumed by it.
This "was fundamental error, an omission of such character that the result
cannot stand, whether it be considered in effect fradulent or otherwise. While
the award in terms covers the issues submitted, it now appears plainly that
the more important issue as to the amount involved was not even considered
by the umpire. However, therefore, we may characterize the operation by
which it was reached, the award is not responsive to the issues submitted
and should be vacated as a matter of law." Id. at 318, 215 N.W. at 67.
In Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 510, 229 N.W. 792
(1930), a lessee, with two years of his term remaining, insured improvements
he had made which would revert to the lessor at the end of the term. An
appraisal of a fire loss permitting recovery of the full value of the improve-
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Several Minnesota cases have considered the question of prejudice on the part of the arbitrator, most of them involving loss appraisals under fire insurance policies. The following guiding principle
has been laid down:
It is the general rule that a person is disqualified to act as
arbitrator who has any secret interest in the result or decision
of the controversy, or if there exists any relationship or family
connection between the arbitrator and a party to the submission,
or if he had formed an opinion or is otherwise prejudiced in
respect to the subject-matter. The board of arbitrators is a quasi
court, governed by rules applicable to common-law arbitration,
and should constitute a body of disinterested men, whose business it is to proceed in a judicial and impartial manner to ascertain the facts in controversy, without regard to the manner in
which the duty has been devolved upon them ....

Arbitrators

not avowedly selected as partisans are, indeed, bound, as in the
execution of a joint trust, to look impartially
at the true merits
79
of the matter submitted to their judgment.
The question is essentially one of fact for determination in each
individual case and the determination of the trial court will usually
be sustained. 0
Several possible objections to the award are open to the losing
party under subsections 3 and 5. One is that there was no agreement
to arbitrate the subject matter in dispute. As has already been noted,
this could have been the basis of a motion to compel or stay the arbitration. If such a motion was made and adjudicated, the point canments rather than their value for the remainder of the term was held
unenforceable.
The last two cases reflect a desire to limit the function of appraisers
to that of fixing monetary value, leaving to the courts the determination of
what is to be valued. Whatever the merits of this policy, it is inapplicable to
arbitrations generally.
79. Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 91
Minn. 210, 213, 97 N.W. 875, 876 (1909), aff'd on rehearing,91 Minn. 217, 98
N.W. 100 (1904).
The quotation recognizes that there may be arbitrators intended to be
selected as partisans. This is not uncommon in labor arbitrations and even in
commercial arbitrations. See Note, The Use of Tripartite Boards in Labor,
Commercial, and International Arbitration, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1954).
This is recognized by the Uniform Act in § 12 quoted above and in § 5(c).
See also § 2(c). Obviously, in such a case, the award should not be set
aside on this ground.
80. That an appraiser acted for insurance companies in other cases is
not in itself evidence of bias. McQuaid Market House Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
147 Minn. 254, 180 N.W. 97 (1920). But if his conduct shows a persistent
attitude of favoring the party selecting him and he has a history of long
association with insurance companies in adjusting similar losses, the trial
court may be warranted in finding him disqualified. Produce Refrigerator Co.
v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 91 Minn. 210, 97 N.W. 875 (1904), aff'd
on rehearing, 91 Minn. 217, 98 N.W. 100 (1904) ; Christianson v. Norwich
Union Fire Ins. Soc., 84 Minn. 526, 88 N.W. 16 (1901), (bias accompanied
with private gathering of information on which award was based) ; Levine
v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 66 Minn. 138, 68 N.W. 855 (1896).
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not be raised again on a motion to vacate the award. But, even if
there is such an agreement, the further objection may be raised that
the arbitrator's award did not remain within the limits of his authority as defined by the agreement. Finally, even though the award falls
within the terms of the arbitration agreement, the contention may be
urged that the parties in their submission did not present the issue
which the award purports to decide and was not contested by consent at the arbitration hearing.
When raised, these are questions for judicial determination.
When the award is attacked on the ground that it is one beyond the
power of the arbitrator to make because the terms of the arbitration
clause do not permit him to consider the question or decide as he
did, the problem is again presented as to the degree of judicial interference with the arbitrator's functions permitted by the Uniform
Act. The principles discussed earlier with respect to motions to compel or stay arbitrations are applicable in this instance also. But they
are applied in a different context. There is now an award accompanied with such explanations as the arbitrator has made. The question is not simply whether there was an arbitration agreement in
existence. In addition, the court must decide whether the award
made is one that falls within the reasonable compass of the authority
given him. Thus, if the arbitrator was empowered to construe the
terms of the contract and his award constitutes a construction that
is a reasonably possible one, it should be sustained though the court
may disagree, even violently, with the construction arrived at. This
is what the parties agreed to and should be expected to abide by. It
is only when all reasonable minds would agree that the arbitrator's
award presents an impossible construction of the contract that the
award may be said to have gone beyond what the parties intended
when they entrusted him with the decision of the issue and that the
award should, therefore, be set aside.
A recent Minnesota decision indicates that these principles will
be observed in the construction of the Uniform Act.8 1 A collective
bargaining agreement entered into between the parties provided that
any dispute arising "as to the meaning and application of the provisions '' 82 of the contract, should, if not otherwise settled, be submitted to an arbitration board, its decision to "be final and binding
on both parties." 83 It added also that the board should "not have
81. Cournoyer v. American Television & Radio Co., 83 N.W. 2d 409
(Minn. 1957). The case arose prior to the adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act and involved the application of judge-made law.
82. Id. at 411.
83. Ibid.
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authority to modify, change'or amend any of the terms or provisions
of this Agreement or to add to or delete from this Agreement."84
A term of the contract provided that if lay-offs became necessary, "the employee having the greatest length of continuous service, skill and ability shall be the last laid off and the first recalled." 5
Lay-offs occurring, a dispute occurred over whether the employer
had observed this requirement. On submission to arbitration, an
award was rendered favorable to the employees. The arbitrators
construed the phrase "greatest length of continuous service, skill
and ability" so that the term "greatest" applied only to "length of
service" and not to "skill and ability." The employer's contention
was that this interpretation was "demonstrably and inescapably
wrong"''1 and, hence, modified and changed the terms of the agreement.
In rejecting this contention, Justice Matson stated:
In passing on the issue of whether the award of an arbitrator
may be set aside as invalid because of alleged misinterpretation
of controlling contract provisions, it is well to bear in mind the
general rule that an arbitrator, in the absence of any agreement
limiting his authority, is the final judge of both law and fact,
including the interpretation of the terms of any contract, and
his award will not be reviewed or set aside for mistake of either
law or fact in the absence of fraud, mistake in applying his own
theory, misconduct, or other disregard of duty. An award will
not be set aside merely because the court thinks the arbitrators
erred either as to the law or the facts. If the rule were otherwise,
arbitration procedings, instead of facilitating the settlement of
controversies, would serve but to delay the- final determination
of the rights of the parties.8 7
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. In Zelle v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 242 Minn. 439, 446, 65
NAV. 2d 583, 589 (1954), the court declared:
Arbitration has been looked upon with favor in this state both in the
statutory and decision field. This court has declared that arbitrators
constitute private tribunals, deriving their powers from the parties as
manifested by the terms of the submission; that the submission is the
commission of the arbitrator; that, while judges are in duty bound to
apply the applicable law in deciding cases, arbitrators do not exercise
judicial power; that arbitrators derive their power from the parties,
which power may include deciding the law as well as the facts, and the
parties are bound thereby; and that the arbitrators may do what no
other person acting in the capacity of one who judges can or has a right
to do, namely, they may intentionally decide contrary to the law and still
have their judgment stand. It follows that, if the parties by their agreement direct that a dispute shall be decided in accordance with applicable
law, the arbitrators will be bound thereby; if the parties have not
insisted that the applicable law shall govern the decision on the facts,
the arbitrators may decide the dispute according to their notion of
justice without regard to the applicable law.
The former Minnesota arbitration statute, Minn. Stat. §572.05 (5) (1953),

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:333

Since we have here no mistake by the arbitrators in the application of their own theory, rule, or formula, and no evidence of
fraud, the arbitrator's award may be impeached only if it appears
that their conclusions, and the inferences upon which they are
based, are so at variance with any conclusions which might legitimately be drawn from the evidence before them - including the
interpretation of the contract - as to imply bad faith or a failure
to exercise an honest judgment.""
What this comes down to saying is that an impossible construction to which no reasonable mind could agree will not be sustained.
In that case, good faith or honest ignorance should not, and undoubtedly will not, save it. Such cases are, of course, quite rare. As
the court held in the Cournoyer case, the interpretation there placed
by the arbitrator on the contract, while not necessarily the only or
better one, was plainly a permissible one.
Uncertainty or incompleteness of the award, commonly found
in statutes on the subject, 9 is not included in the Uniform Arbitration Act as a ground for vacation of the award. This was omitted in
the belief that it was unnecessary and undesirable since under section nine the award may be returned to the arbitrator by the court or
the parties to correct and clarify. 0
An occasional case may arise where the arbitrator has died, disappeared or refuses further to act. If the award has failed to make
a full disposition of the issues submitted or is of such degree of uncertainty as to what is to be performed that it cannot be enforced,
it can properly be said that there has as yet been no award or determination made by the arbitrator and the obligation to continue the
arbitration still remains,9 ' assuming the time limits of the contract
permitted vacation of an award on the ground "that the award is contrary
to law and evidence." A provision of this kind was deliberately omitted from
the Uniform Act, and the principles stated in the Cournoyer and Zelle cases
will govern.
88. Cournoyer v. American Television & Radio Co., 83 N.W. 2d 409,
411-12 (Minn. 1957).
89. Thus, the former Minn. Stat. §572.05(4) (1953), permitted
vacation if the arbitrators exceeded their powers "or executed them so
imperfectly that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made."
90. See discussion supra, p. 350.
91. See Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W.
798 (1935), in which the employer justified the discharge of an employee on
several grounds. The arbitrators considered only what to them was "the
primary charge" and held the discharge unjustified. Suit was on the award.
The award was held invalid. "Stated generally, the rule is that the award
of arbitrators must be responsive to the submission; that is, it must decide
all of the determinative issues submitted. If on its face it fails in that, the
award is invalid. In other and more accurate words, there is iw award!'
Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra at 90, 259 N.W. at 801.
(Emphasis added.)
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have not expired . 2 A new arbitrator should therefore be appointed
for the purpose.9 3
Another ground for vacation of the award, not mentioned in the
Uniform Act, and which is recognized by the courts irrespective of
statute, is that the contract is illegal or contrary to public policy.
A motion to confirm the award should follow the usual form of
motions under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. 94 It should
request "an order confirming the award rendered by A.B. and C.D.
as arbitrators pursuant to agreement dated
19-,
between petitioner and respondent herein [and as directed by this
court on
19-]
and directing that judgment be entered accordingly." It should be accompanied with copies of the contract of arbitration, the demand for arbitration and the award. Affidavits or other appropriate evidence should also show the due and
proper appointment of the arbitrators, the notice of the arbitration
hearing, the holding of the hearing and the fact that a copy of the
award was delivered to the respondent. The order rendered on the
motion should contain appropriate findings on these matters and, if
the motion is granted, should specify the judgment that is to be
entered.
A motion to vacate an award should specify the grounds upon
which it is based and should be accompanied by affidavits or other
proper documents showing in detail the facts on which these grounds
are based. When the motion is based on fraud, misconduct, bias and
the like, and the facts are in dispute, it will ordinarily be necessary
to receive oral testimony at the hearing of the motion to permit a
full presentation and determination of the issue. The order disposing of the motion should be accompanied by findings corresponding
to those made on a court trial. An order denying the motion to vacate should also order that the award be confirmed and direct the
judgment that is to be entered in accordance with it."'
Actions to enforce the award or to set it aside are superseded by
these motions and are no longer available.
It must not be assumed from this account that the Uniform Arbitration Act offers a general invitation to parties to arbitration
agreements to resort to the procedures it provides. In the great
majority of cases, parties have complied with their agreements to
arbitrate and with the awards rendered and will continue to do so.
92. See §8(b).
93.
94.
95.
and no
confirm

See §3.
The form set out on p. 345 may be adapted for this purpose.
Section 12(4) provides that "if the application to vacate is denied
motion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court shall
the award."
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They will find in the act many helpful and clarifying provisions
designed to facilitate the process. With this state being the first to
adopt the act, the Minnesota courts will have an opportunity to set
the pattern for the country by a fair and sympathetic interpretation
of the statute's terms. When so administered, the effect of the act
will be to discourage those who formerly saw in lengthy and expensive court trials both the opportunity to delay and discourage
resort to the arbitration of disputes to which they had agreed and
the means to frustrate the enforcement of awards. There will always
be a small number of cases in which the parties are in bona fide disagreement as to the scope and meaning of the arbitration clause and
as to the validity of an award. These issues can now be promptly
raised and resolved by a simple motion procedure and with a minimum of expense. The net effect will be to strengthen the arbitration
process.
II

The recent case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills" and
its companion cases97 raise the question as to the extent state courts
may still enforce arbitration clauses appearing in collective bargaining agreements when they affect interstate commerce. These cases
present the possibility that the full benefits of the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act cannot be realized because federal courts
rather than state courts will be utilized, notwithstanding the fact
that a correspondingly effective procedure is not available.
With but few states affording any effective means for the enforcement of arbitration clauses and with the widespread inclusion
of such clauses in collective bargaining agreements, parties to these
agreements have turned increasingly to federal courts as a possible
avenue of relief. More than a summary account of the ensuing development is beyond the purpose of this discussion. But a brief
review of the enforcement of such clauses in federal courts and some
consideration of the impact of the Lincoln Mills case seems necessary to an understanding of the present availability of the Uniform
Arbitration Act.
Parties seeking enforcement of arbitration clauses in federal
courts have relied upon two avenues of approach. One has been by
way of the United States Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925 and patterned on the New York Arbitration Act.98 The other has been resort to section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
96. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
97. Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, 353
U.S. 550 (1957) ; General Electric Co. v. Local 205, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
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commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act.99 Section 2 of the
United States Arbitration Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity....
In enacting this legislation, Congress was under the necessity
of limiting its application to those areas in which Congress might
legitimately act. This is the purpose of the provisions of section 2
that the arbitration clause must be part of a "maritime transaction"
or of a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."
When the clause so qualifies, this section makes it "valid," "irrevocable" and "enforceable." Succeeding sections provide the procedure
for enforcement of the arbitration clause by stay and motion procedure. They provide also in certain contingencies for court appointment of arbitrators, for the appearance of witnesses, for the confirmation or vacation of modification of the award and its reduction to
judgment etc., following in rough measure the New York prototype.
The definitions of "maritime transactions" and "commerce"
appear in section 1 of the act as follows:
'Maritime transactions,' as herein defined, means charter
parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to
wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the
subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty
jurisdiction; 'commerce,' as herein defined, means commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or
between any such Territory and another, and or between any
such Territory any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation,
but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
The several provisions of the Arbitration Act must, of course,
be considered against the background of the general principles which
govern the jurisdiction of federal courts under the federal constitution and statutes, and the constitutional limits on the legislative
powers of Congress. It is elementary that, under present statutes,
98. 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§1-14 (1952).
99. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
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the principal source of federal court jurisdiction depends either upon
diversity of citizenship or upon the existence of a claim made or
question arising under a federal statute or the federal constitution. 00
If an action is brought in a state court on a claim based on a federal
right which might in the first instance have been brought in a federal
court, it may be removed to the federal district court,l 10 or, as it
has done in the case of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 0 2 Congress, may deny the right of such removal and leave the enforcement
of the federal right to the state court in which the plaintiff has
chosen to bring the action. If the action is brought in or removed
to the federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship, the
doctrine of Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins10 3 controls, state substantive
law rather than federal governs, and the power of Congress to enact
substantive laws applicable to such cases is questionable.
Considerations of this character led to the incorporation of provisions in the United States Arbitration Act referred to above and
not found in corresponding state laws. These must be complied with
100. 60 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952) provides:

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between:
(1) Citizens of different States;
(2) Citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof;
(3) Citizens of different States and in which foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
(b) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the
Territories and the District of Columbia.
62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1952) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States.
There are other statutes conferring jurisdiction under prescribed conditions which, for purposes of this discussion, need not be considered.
101. 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1441 (1952) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in the State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard
to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action
shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought
102. See 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C. §56 (1948), and 62 Stat. 939
(1948), 28 U.S.C. §1445 (1952); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223
U.S. 1, 46 (1912); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
103. 304U.S. 64 (1938).
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before relief under this act can be obtained. Reading sections 1 and
2 together, the arbitration clause must appear in a "maritime transaction" 104 or in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving"' 1 5
"commerce among the several states."' 1 6 The latter alternative can
be given a broad or narrow interpretation. Lower federal court decisions tend to favor the former and to identify it as equivalent to
the constitutional grant of federal power over interstate commerce.107
Even though the arbitration clause qualifies in this respect, it
must not fall within the exception stated in section 1. It must not
be a contract "of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Conflict has existed among the lower federal courts over
the meaning of this restriction. Some do not consider a collective
bargaining agreement in which the arbitration clause appears as
a contract of "employment," since from it alone no specific hiring
results. 0 8 Others do, on the ground that the history of the act shows
such legislative intent.10 9 Some cases give the phrase "any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" a narrow construction and confine it to the movement of goods in interstate commerce by analogy to seamen and railroad workers, the references to which the phrase immediately succeeds." 0
Further hurdles must be faced if relief is sought under section 4
of the Federal Arbitration Act in the way of an order directing that
arbitration proceed. The court from which the order is sought must
be one "which save for such agreement [to arbitrate], would have
104. 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §2 (1952).
105. Ibid.

106. 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §1 (1952).

107. "'Commerce' is given its traditional definition...." United Steelworkers v. Galand-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1957). See
Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating To Arbitration
Under The United States Arbitration Act, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580,
585 (1952). Compare the following observation: "No maritime transaction
is involved here. Nor does this contract evidence 'a transaction involving
commerce' within the meaning of §2 of the Act. There is no showing that
petitioner while performing his duties under the employment contract was
working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaged
in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our decisions."
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956).
108. Local 19, Warehouse v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776,
781 (6th Cir. 1956).
109. United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1957) ; International Union v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., 168
F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951). See cases reviewed in Sturges and
Murphy, supra note 107 at 605-17.
110. Tenny Engineering v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207
F2d 450 (3rd Cir. 1953). See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal
Courts,67 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1954).
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jurisdiction under the judicial code at law, in equity, or in admiralty
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between
the parties .... ." This again offers difficulties of construction. What
it appears to say is that the Arbitration Act and the arbitration
clause which it undertakes to validate and effectuate are not in themselves bases for federal court jurisdiction. There must be an independent basis for such jurisdiction covering "the subject matter of
a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.""' As
already noted, the independent source of jurisdiction may be either
diversity of citizenship of the parties or the presence of a claim
which is dependent in some measure on federal law or the federal
constitution.
Under the Erie doctrine, if jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, the governing substantive law must be that of the state.
Under this case and its successors, the line of demarcation between
substance and procedure is essentially dependent on whether differences in a principle or rule on a given question will substantially
affect the outcome of the litigation so that with conflicting views
prevailing in the state and federal courts, different results will follow depending on whether the action is in the state or federal court., 2
Hence, if the United States Arbitration Act is to apply in a diversity
of citizenship case, its provisions must be considered as procedural
within the meaning of this test. For a time, it was thought that they
could be so considered. In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.113S
the question was raised whether the New York Arbitration Act
could be resorted to in the New York courts to enforce an arbitra111. If this means that a justiciable dispute must be present, capable
of becoming the subject matter of an action in federal court, it would place
a serious limitation on the availability of the act. It would prevent the enforcement, for example, of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between
equally divided stockholders over the policy to be pursued by the corporation,

see O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: IntraInstitutional Arbitration, 67 IHarv. L. Rev. 786 (1954), or of a reference to
arbitration of a dispute as to future wages to be paid. See § 12 of the
Uniform Arbitration Act, discussion in the text at p. 336.
Succeeding sections of the United States Arbitration Act do not make
clear whether the term "court" is likewise so restricted in authorizing other
applications to the court. No doubt, such construction was intended.
112. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), stating the
intent of the Erie case was "to insure that, in all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, as far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of a
State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result."
Id. at 109. A state statute of limitations was held substantive in character.
113. 264U.S. 109 (1924).
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tion clause in a charter party as against the contention that this
would constitute state intervention in the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal admiralty courts. The contention was not sustained and
the New York courts were permitted to proceed. The position taken
was that the federal admiralty courts recognized arbitration clauses
as valid and enforceable although the remedies afforded were not
always complete. The legislation conferring admiralty jurisdiction
on the federal courts permitted states to extend "the right of a common law remedy" and arbitration was recognized, however limited
in degree, at common law.
[T]he state, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such
remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit.
New York, therefore, had the power to confer upon its courts
the authority to compel parties within its jurisdiction to specifically perform an agreement for arbitration, which is valid by the
general maritime law, as well as by the law of the State, which
is contained in a contract made in New York and which, by its
terms, is to be performed there.
The Arbitration Law [of New York] deals merely with the
remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations voluntarily
and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to modify the
substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts
of admiralty.1 This reasoning would appear to warrant the conclusion that the
Federal Arbitration Act was likewise merely a procedural act which
would apply in accordance with section 4 where jurisdiction was
grounded on diversity of citizenship. 115 This question was presented
in Bernhardtv. Polygraphic Co."" and the opposite conclusion was
reached. The action was one for breach of contract and had been
removed to the federal district court. The contract contained an arbitration clause but there was no showing that a maritime transaction
was involved or that the contract involved interstate commerce.
Jurisdiction depended solely on diversity of citizenship. The defendant sought a stay pending arbitration on the ground that New York
law was applicable. The federal district court denied the stay on the
ground that Vermont law applied and Vermont did not enforce arbitration agreements. Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act
also authorizes a stay of an action brought in violation of an arbi114. Id. at 124.
In Marine Transit Co. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277 (1932), the reasoning of the Red Cross Line case was followed in sustaining the Federal
Arbitration Act as applied to admiralty cases as against the contention that
it was incompatible with the judicial power in admiralty and maritime cases
conferred by Art. III of the United States Constitution.
115. See Sturges & Murphy, supra note 107.
116. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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tration agreement.117 The Supreme Court held, first, that this section was subject to the limitations of sections 1 and 2 discussed
above. Otherwise, it felt, " a constitutional question might be presented. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not
have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable
to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases."" 8
The court continued:
The question remains whether, apart from the Federal Act,
a provision of a contract providing for arbitration is enforceable
in a diversity case.
The Court of Appeals, in disagreeing with the District Court
as to the effect of an arbitration agreement under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, followed its earlier decision of Murray Oil Products
Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 338, which held that, 'Arbitration is merely a form of trial, to be adopted in the action itself, in place of the trial at common law: it is like a reference to
a master, or an 'advisory trial' under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure...'
We disagree with that conclusion. We deal here with a right
to recover that owes its existence to one of the States, not to the
United States. The federal court enforces the state-created right
by rules of procedure which it has acquired from the Federal
Government and which, therefore, are not identical with those
of the state courts. Yet, in spite of that difference in procedure,
the federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity
ca~e is, as we said in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
108, in substance 'only another court of the State.' The federal
court, therefore, may not 'substantially affect the enforcement
of the right as given by the State.' Id., 109. If the federal court
allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit
is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or
shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by
the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an
important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may
make a radical difference in ultimate result."19
117. 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §3 (1952) provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application
of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
118. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
119. Id. at 202-03.
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The Red Cross Line case was not discussed although the characterization of statutes dealing with the enforcement of arbitration
agreements differed widely in the two cases. But the cases can be
reconciled. In Red Cross Line, both state and federal law sustained
the validity of arbitration agreements, the difference between the
two relating only to the details of procedure for enforcement. In
Bernhardt,the difference was more fundamental. In practical effect,
the state law denied the validity of such agreements and thus was
in direct contradiction to the federal law. That this denial and the
contradiction appeared in procedural terms should be immaterial in
applying the doctrine of the Erie Ry. Co. case. Substantive rights
can rise no higher than their ability to be enforced through appropriate procedural steps.
It is believed, therefore, that the two cases are not inconsistent
with the position that if an action is properly brought or removed to
a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the relevant
state law provides for substantial enforcement of arbitration agreements and the requirements of sections 1 and 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act have been met, the procedural details of the latter act
will be applied rather than those of the state.
Other than diversity of citizenship, the primary source of jurisdiction contemplated by section 4 would be a claim which invokes
federal law or the Constitution. A charter party subject to federal
maritime jurisdiction would be an example. If the charter party
contained an arbitration clause, it could be enforced in federal court
in the exercise of its maritime or admiralty jurisdiction and the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act would apply.1 20 It has frequently been assumed in lower federal court decisions that the same
result follows if the contract containing the arbitration clause involved interstate commerce within the meaning of section 1 of the
act.1 2- 1 Section 2 states that the clause "shall be valid, irrevocable
and enforceable." This certainly appears to create a federal right to
its enforcement. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the federal
courts thus have jurisdiction to carry out such enforcement. To so
conclude from sections 1 and 2 alone would ignore the intended limitations appearing in section 4 that the only federal court to which
application can be made is one which "would have jurisdiction under
the judicial code at law, in equity, or in admiralty" save for such
120. Marine Transit Co. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
121. San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F.Supp. 825 (S.D. N.Y. 1946),
aff'd pcr curiam, 163 F. 2d 310 (1947) ; Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis
Brossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933).
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agreement.' 22 Hence, it would appear that some other source of
jurisdiction than the Federal Arbitration Act must be found in federal law before it, or at least section 4, and probably the procedural
facilities provided in subsequent sections, can be resorted to in cases
123
not involving diversity of citizenship.
Because of the multiplicity of uncertainties attendant on the use
of the Federal Arbitration Act, it has not often been resorted to.
With the rapidly expanding use of arbitration as a means of settling
labor disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements and
in the desire to resort to some means of judicial enforcement as an
alternative to economic conflict, lawyers have sought relief in the
federal courts through another avenue of possible jurisdiction. They
have relied upon section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act' 2 ' usually
without much regard to its possible supplementation by the United
States Arbitration Act. Section 301 (a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
This section, which on its face is little more than a grant of
jurisdiction, obviously required considerable construction of meaning beyond its literal terms if support was to be found in it for the
enforcement of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. It would be necessary to conclude that it intended not
merely to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, but also to provide a body of federal substantive law which gave effect and validity
and enforcibility to an arbitration clause. In view of the generality
of the terms of the section, any such intendment could hardly be
confined to arbitration clauses but would be applicable to all aspects of the collective bargaining agreement. We are here, of course,
only concerned with the former.
Prior to the Lincoln Mills case, lower federal court decisions on
this question reached conflicting results. 2 The various problems
122. The absence of a similar provision in §3, providing for a stay of

"any suit or proceeding.. brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration..." is consistent with the point made
in the text, for such "suit or proceeding" could not be brought or survive
absent a basis of jurisdiction independent of the clause.
123. See Amalgamated Ass'n v. Southern Bus Line, 189 F.2d 219
(5th Cir. 1951).
124. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §185 (1952).
125. See Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F.

Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953). This case, which has had wide influence, did
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considered, how they were resolved and the confused state of the
law is well illustrated by the decisions of the lower courts from
which appeals had been taken in Lincoln Mills and its companion
cases.
In the Lincoln Mills case itself, the district court had "decreed
that the Employer submit the grievances to arbitration as provided
in Article IX(F) of the agreement. Jurisdiction was found under
§301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A.
§185. "112a The majority opinion of the court of appeals took a different view. It conceded that the act gave the federal courts jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action betveen employers and labor
organizations, but it could not find any congressional authority to
enforce an arbitration clause by specific enforcement. It did not find
such authority in the United States Arbitration Act because a collective bargaining agreement is a "contract of employment" within
the meaning of the exception stated in section 1 of that act.1 27
Neither did it consider that section 301 (a) conferred any such
right. Since applicable state law of Alabama likewise did not enforce
such agreements, the district court order was reversed. The majority opinion stated:
We have, in the case before us, a complaint by the Union
that the Employer has breached a provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Out of such complaint arose a case and controversy of which the Federal courts have jurisdiction under the
Constitution as implemented by Section 301. And see 28
U.S.C.A. §1337. But it does not follow that because jurisdiction
is given to Federal courts, there is a new federal law concept
that authorizes the courts to enforce submission to arbitration.
Before such a result is reached, we must find a rule of law derived from state or Federal sources. We do not think it matters
whether a right to enforce submission to arbitration is or is not
substantive, as was considered in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company of America, 2 Cir., 1954, 218 F.2d 948; or whether
as said by Mr. Justice Brandeis, there is 'the substantive right
created by agreement to submit disputes to arbitration,' which he
said 'is recognized as a perfect obligation.'
not meet the question squarely. The action was one for specific performance.
Under Massachusetts law, the arbitration clause was valid. The court deemed
it unnecessary, therefore, to determine which law governed the rights of the
parties, since "it seems to this Court that the Congress which enacted §301
would have preferred that remedies should be determined without reference
to state law and should include specific enforcement of arbitration clauses in
labor contracts." Id. at 141. To treat specific performance as a matter of
remedy to be governed by the law of the forum was considered to be a "more
mechanical way" of reaching the same conclusion.
126. As stated by the court of appeals, Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers
Union, 230 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1956).
127. See discussion supra, p. 361.
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Finding nothing of Federal origin or in the laws of Alabama,
of either common law or statutory enactment, or from any other
source, that requires or permits, or from which we might, in the
language of Mr. Justice Douglas, fashion a rule requiring or
permitting, the enforcement of the covenant for arbitration of
grievances,1 28 and concluding that Section 301 does not of itself
provide or furnish the source for such a rule, we hold that there
is no legal right to the relief sought. 2 9
The second case originated in the federal district court of Massachusetts. 130 A union sought to obtain specific enforcement of an arbitration clause as equitable relief under section 301 (a). The district
court granted the defendant's motion to strike the claim for want
of jurisdiction on the ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbidding injunctions in labor disputes 31 applied. With this the court
of appeals disagreed, 3 2 and since the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not
apply, it was deemed necessary to consider whether there was a legal
basis upon which relief could be granted. On this question, the court
accepted the views of the American Thread Co. case 3 3 that whether
specific performance was an available remedy should be governed
by the law of the forum and, hence, by federal law. It felt that the
Bernhardt case 4 was inapplicable since that case was concerned
with the law applicable in diversity of citizenship cases under the
Erie Ry. Co. doctrine where the objective was identity of result in
the application of state law. Here, jurisdiction was under section
301 (a) to which that objective was irrelevent. But the court felt
that in view of traditional judicial hostility to arbitration clauses, "a
pretty explicit statutory basis" for specific enforcement should be
found and this it could not discover in section 301 (a) :
128. The reference is to the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Ass'n
of Westinghouse v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 465 (1955), in
which he stated: "I agree.., that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act created
federal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and
controversies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts,
and permitted those courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state
law, or from other germane sources, federal rules for the construction and
interpretation of those collective bargaining agreements."
The case held that the right to recover certain wages in dispute was
personal to the employee and gave no right of action to the union. But no

one opinion commanded the assent of a majority of the court. For a discussion of the case, see Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale L. J.167 (1956).
129. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 88 (5th
Cir. 1956).
130. Local 205 v. General Elec. Co., 129 F.Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1955).
131. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (1952).
132. Local 205 v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (lst Cir. 1956).
133. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F.Supp. 137
(D. Mass. 1953), discussed in footnote 125 supra.
134. See text, supra p. 363.

UNIFOR1

ARBITRATION ACT

Practical grounds support this conclusion. A glance at a typical
arbitration statute shows that it lays down procedural specifications for use of the new power to compel arbitration. Topics
covered may include requisites of a submission, selection of an
arbitrator, procedure and subpoena power for the arbitration,
stay and specific enforcement authority in a court, grounds and
procedure for confirming or vacating an award. A court decision
could overrule the common law bars to specific enforcement, but
could not substitute for them the comprehensive and consistent
scheme that legislative action could afford, and which is necessary for effective yet safeguarded arbitration.3 5
But the court did find in the United States Arbitration Act, the
needed authority to enforce the arbitration clause. The collective
bargaining agreement before it was a contract "involving commerce" and was deemed not to be a "contract of employment" within the meaning of the exception stated in section 1.13 6 Since section
301 (a) conferred jurisdiction on the court, jurisdiction did not
depend on the arbitration clause and hence the limitation of section
4 of the Arbitration Act was met.
These same principles were applied by the same court of appeals
in the third case which came before the United States Supreme
37

Court.1

With these three cases before the Supreme Court, the majority
opinion was written in the Lincoln Mills case, with Mr. Justice
Douglas speaking for the majority of five justices. 38 Section 301 (a)
was considered not only to be a grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts but also to call for the application of federal substantive law.
After reviewing the history of the section, the Court observed:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this
135. Local 205 v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 1956).
136. See discussion supra, p. 361.
137. Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 233 F.2d 104
(1st Cir. 1956). Although the procedure in district court was by way of
summary judgment, substantial compliance with the requirements of the
Arbitration Act was found. There was no disputed fact question and the
primary question was the arbitrability of the dispute involved under the
terms of the arbitration agreement. The opinion of the district court appears
in United Textile Workers v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 131 F.Supp. 767 (S. D.
Me. 1955).
138. Mr. Justice Burton, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joined, concurred in result but did "not subscribe to the conclusion of the Court that
the substantive lav to be applied in a suit under §301 is federal law....
[Siome federal rights may necessarily be involved in a §301 case, and hence
...the constitutionality of §301 can be upheld as a congressional grant to
Federal District Courts of what has been called 'protective jurisdiction.'"
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S.448, 460 (1957).
Mr. Justice Black did not participate.
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light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the
federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal
policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on
behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be best obtained only in that way.
It seems... clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which
placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication rejecting the common-law rule... against
enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. We would
undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly
as only conferring jurisdiction over labor organizations.
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied
in suits under § 301 (a) ? We conclude that the substantive law
to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law which the courts
must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.... The
Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in
certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
express mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
problems. . . .Federal interpretation of the federal law will
govern, not state law.... But state law, if compatible with the
purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy. . . .Any state law
applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not
be an independent source of private rights. 39
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.
In affirming the Local 205 case, the Court noted that the court of
appeals had held that section 301(a) did not supply or create the
necessary substantive law and that the United States Arbitration
Act applied, but observed: "We follow in part a different path
than the Court of Appeals, though we reach the same result.' 4 0
The vigorous dissent of Mr. justice Frankfurter indicates the
strong objections that may be made to the position of the Court. He
believed that the section's history demonstrated it to be a purely
procedural statute; that to hold it created an as yet unknown substantive federal law presented grave and complex problems of
conflict between state law and courts and federal law and courts;
that judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements would defeat rather than further collective bar139. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-57
(1957). The court also held that the Norris-La Guardia Act did not apply.
140. General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, 353 U. S. 547, 548 (1957).
The Goodall-Sanford case was affirmed simply by reference to the
Lincoln Mills case.
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gaining and the arbitration process; that Congress, in excepting
"contracts of employment" from the Federal Arbitration Act manifested a policy of non-enforcement of such clauses which should not
be taken "by implication" to have been repealed by section 301 (a) ;
that, since section 301 (a) does not create federal substantive law,
state law must govern and there are grave constitutional objections
to federal jurisdiction to enforce state law in other than diversity
of citizenship cases; and finally, that if any substantive rights are
to be drawn from section 301 (a), they can consist of no more than
the right of a union to enter into a binding collective bargaining contract with an employer and to sue thereon and, since this right is not
the basis of the present suits, it cannot be relied upon as a basis of
jurisdiction.
These objections failed to persuade the majority of the court.
The decision to recognize sanctions for the enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, and to base this on
the thin reed of section 301 (a) represents a response to the pressures which have prevailed upon federal courts from both labor
and management to provide some relief in the face of the failure
of the states to do so. It represents a repudiation of the notion sometimes vigorously asserted that arbitration agreements between union
and employer must remain beyond the pale of judicial enforcement
and the parties left to the destructive forces of economic warfare.
The Lincoln Mills case is a landmark in the development of the
law governing labor arbitration and of the federal courts' participation in it.
But it is no more than a landmark. The extent of its holding is
that under section 301 (a) arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements may be enforced by the parties in federal courts
under principles of federal substantive law yet to be interpreted
and developed. This leaves unresolved not only the content of the
substantive law which will control, but also the procedure that may
be employed for the enforcement of arbitration clauses and the role
of state law and state courts. This void must be filled either by the
long and painful process of litigation in federal courts or by
legislation.
The decision itself recognizes the problem of developing the
federal substantive law which it determines must be applied and
suggests some of the sources to which one must look.
With respect to the procedure to be followed in seeking enforcement of an arbitration clause falling within section 301(a), the
decision remains silent. No mention is made of the possible applica-
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tion of the United States Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the
court of appeals in one of the cases before the Court expressly based
its decision on this act. The court of appeals is simply affirmed "by
a different path." Studiously ignored also is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observation that "I find rejection, thought not explicit, of
the availability of the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements in the silent treatment
given that Act by the Court's opinion."' 41 In the cases before the
Court, the procedure of the Arbitration Act had in fact not been
resorted to and instead an action for specific performance had been
brought. It may be that the Court desired only to defer determination of this question until it was squarely before it.
If the United States Arbitration Act is not to be available, the
parties to the arbitration agreement face the prospect of the delay
and expense of long drawn out litigation in federal courts similar
to that which prevailed in this state prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Act. Suits will be required for specific performance. If
actions are brought on the contract on issues covered by the arbitration clause, the only remedy will be by way of affirmative defense.
Awards can be reduced to enforceable judgment only by way of
action on the award. Awards claimed to be the product of fraud,
prejudice or misconduct may be attacked by actions to set aside with
accompanying injunctions against their enforcement. All this will
indeed provide a fruitful means of tying up arbitration in the
federal courts for months on end. But thus far this has been the
only procedural method of settling disputes that courts have succeeded in devising without the aid of legislation.
In view of these prospects, it might well be held, in the exercise
of "judicial inventiveness," that Congress in enacting the United
States Arbitration Act expressed its policy that arbitration agreements and awards should be enforced by the summary procedures
there prescribed. Section 301(a) was enacted with that policy in
force. Hence, those procedures may be adopted by analogy in 301 (a)
cases and adapted by the courts to the needs of section 301 (a). At
least one lower court had proceeded in this manner prior to the
42
Lincoln Mills case.
141. Id. at 466.
142. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F.Supp.
137, 142 (D.Mass. 1953), stating:
Defendant's final point is that this case cannot be sent to arbitration
because no arbitration has been named under the 1951 memoranda
[entered into between the parties]. But this defect can be and should be
cured by this Court adopting as a guiding analogy the practice under §5
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §5. If the parties are unable
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The Lincoln Mills case leaves unsettled also the jurisdiction of
state courts to enforce arbitration agreements which fall within the
scope of section 301 (a). Neither the case nor the section says that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be exclusive. That federal
substantive law must govern does not require that only the federal
courts enforce it. Cases denying state power over matters committed exclusively to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board 43 are inapplicable for neither section 301(a) nor
Lincoh Mills makes it apparent that federal courts alone are to enforce the act. This is the view taken in a recent California case in
which the court stated:
Section 301 does not expressly exclude state courts. On the
contrary, it merely declares that an action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a federal court.
Surely, if Congress had intended to exclude state courts it would
have used more forthright language. Nor does enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements in state courts conflict with
any federal policy embodied in section 301 or any other part of
the federal statute. [Union officials] contend that the rationale of
Garner v. Teamsters Union, and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., which excludes state court jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices in order that the National Labor Relations Board may
be free to develop a consistent federal policy, applies equally to
exclude state court jurisdiction over actions that could be
brought under section 301. Section 301, however, does not confine jurisdiction to one expert tribunal for the development of
federal policy, but on the contrary gives jurisdiction to all the
federal district courts. The possibility of conflict between state
and federal courts is no greater than the possibility of conflict
among the federal courts themselves, with uniformity ultimately
dependent in either case on review by the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, federal courts are no more expert than
state courts in the interpretation of contracts....
State courts therefore have concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts over actions that can be brought in the federal courts
under section 301. It is obvious that in exercising this jurisdiction state courts are no longer free to apply state law, but must
within ten days to agree upon an arbitrator, this Court will appoint one.
Plaintiff is directed to prepare a suitable decree adopting, whenever
practical, the forms and procedures which would be used if this case fell
within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The Court in Lincoh; M11fills referred to this case as "perhaps the leading
decision" for the view that federal law governs. Textile Workers Union v.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
143. Bethlehem Co. v. State Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); LaCrosse
Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1949).

144. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,

315 P. 2d 322, 329-30 (Calif. 1957). Accord: In re Steinberg, 26 U.S.L.

Week 2166-67 (N.Y.Sup.Ct 1957).
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apply the federal law of collective bargaining agreements, otherwise the scope of the litigants' rights will depend on the accident
of the forum in which the action is brought. What the substantive federal law of collective bargaining agreements is we
cannot now know. Until it is elaborated by the federal courts
we
144
assume it does not differ significantly from our own law.
Assuming that a state action may be brought to enforce an
arbitration agreement controlled by federal substantive law under
section 301 (a), matters of procedure will undoubtedly be controlled
by state law, the law of the forum. This introduces new problems
of what is procedure and what is substance. The distinction drawn
in applying the doctrine of Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins in diversity
of citizenship cases will not be controlling for the problem is a different one. Here the question is how far may the state prescribe
rules and principles, under the label of procedure, which must be
followed in the enforcement of the federal right to performance of
the arbitration clause. The essential test which suggests itself is the
protection of the federal right against procedural limitations, the
effect of which would be to encumber, defeat or limit the right itself. 45 As a minimum, that right would seem to encompass specific
performance of the arbitration agreement, the federally developed
principles for determining arbitrability including the limits on judicial interference with the arbitrator's powers, the maintenance of
minimum legal safeguards necessary to assure an adequate arbitration hearing, the recognition of federally defined grounds for vacating or modifying awards, and, finally, the enforcement of the award
itself. Collateral questions of substantive law traditionally left to the
states such as the general law of contracts, on which, of course, the
collective bargaining agreement, is premised and general defenses
such as fraud, mistake, and rescission will probably be left to state
law as not within the concern of the Taft-Hartley Act. A state procedure which proceeded consistent with or which was designed to
further the federal right as thus defined would control. This would
include procedures for the enforcement of the arbitration agreement
and the award such as the summary motion procedure provided by
the Uniform Arbitration Act, the issuance of subpoenas and the
taking of depositions, court appointment of arbitrators, the form of
the notice of the arbitration hearing, continuances of these hearings,
the form of the award, etc.
For states not now providing an adequate procedure for the enforcement of arbitration clauses, the Lincoln Mills case raises the
145.

See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924).
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difficult problem of the degree to which the federal government can
insist on state enforcement of a federal right.1 " This problem will
not be present in Minnesota and other states having the Uniform
Arbitration Act or a corresponding statute. The Uniform Act provides a simple, expeditious and effective means of enforcing arbitration agreements. It gives full recognition to the federal right in all
its aspects.
There remains the question of removal to the federal court of
proceedings brought in a state court to enforce an arbitration agreement. If the action is based on section 301(a), it would seem clear
147
that it is based on a federal law and that the case is removable.
But the complaint may be grounded on the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act. This would raise the question whether section 301 (a)
has pre-empted the field or whether a state may still legislate on the
subject consistent with the federal law. Neither section 301 (a) nor
the Lincoln Mills case gives the answer. All the case decides is that
in a federal action, which section 301 (a) permits, federal substantive law controls. The question was not before the Court, and it did
not decide, that similar state legislation is forbidden. 4 If not forbidden, and the complaint is based on state law, of course it cannot
be removed to the federal district court.
Notwithstanding the problems the Lincoln Mills decision raises,
it was a desirable and laudable decision, for it gives judicial recognition via statutory interpretation to the urgent need for some effective means of enforcing arbitration agreements, particularly those
in the labor-management field. For the first time, arbitration clauses
appearing in collective bargaining agreements and affecting interstate commerce may be enforced on a nationwide scale. This stands
in strong contrast to the obstinate adherence of most courts to the
outmoded and discredited concept of revocability and unenforcibility of arbitration clauses in the face of their familiar, normal, and
necessary use in modern commercial and industrial life. The variety
of unsolved problems which the decision presents, some of which
146. See Wollett and Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor
Agreement, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 445, 463 (1955) ; Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 506 (1954). See also
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 315 P. 2d
322, 330 (Calif. 1957).
147. "Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties ....
"62 Stat. 938 (1947), 28 U.S.C.
§1441(b) (1952).
148. Compare Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109
(1924).
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have been noted in this discussion, merely demonstrates the unsatisfactory state of the law and the need for some positive action. Left
to themselves, the federal courts, in the course of time and with
much expense, friction and delay sustained by the interests involved,
can work out some solutions, procedures and principles implementing the Lincoln Mills decision. The legislative approach, however,
is much the preferable one. Only some relatively simple legislation
is needed.
It is suggested that this legislation proceed along the following
lines. The United States Arbitration Act should be revised following the model of the Uniform Arbitration Act with such changes
and additions as may be needed to adapt it to the federal forum. It
should provide explicitly that proceedings for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements coming under section 301 (a) should be govered by the Federal Arbitration Act in all actions brought in federal court. This accomplished, removal of state actions based on
section 301(a) might well be denied when the action is in a state
which has adopted the Uniform Act or legislation substantially similar to it. The Employer's Liability Act, in some measure, furnishes
an analogy.- 49 The end result would be a uniform substantive and
procedural law governing in both state and federal courts, with state
courts sharing a large measure of the burden of the routine administration of the law. If the Lincoln Mills decision leads to this accomplishment, it will, indeed, be a milestone in the history of the law of
arbitration.
149. 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C. §56 (1952) and 62 Stat. 939 (1948),
28 U.S.C. §1445 (1952).

